We exploit variation in consumer price inflation across 71 Russian regions to examine the relationship between the perceived stability of the domestic currency and financial dollarization. Our results show that regions with higher inflation experience an increase in deposit dollarization and a decrease in the dollarization of loans to households and firms in non-tradable sectors. The negative impact of inflation on credit dollarization is weaker in regions with less integrated banking markets. This suggests that the asset-liability management of banks constrains the currency-portfolio choices of both households and firms without a natural currency hedge.
Introduction
Financial dollarization, the widespread holding of assets and liabilities in a foreign currency, is viewed as both a constraint on monetary policy and a threat to financial stability in many emerging markets. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policy makers have emphasized the need for de-dollarization (or de-euroization) of deposits and loans, particularly in Latin America and eastern Europe (Garcia-Escribano and Sosa, 2011) . A credible monetary policy with low and stable consumer price inflation, such as through an inflation targeting regime, is seen as a key ingredient to kick-start dedollarization. The objective of this paper is to examine how and to what extent the stability of the domestic currency affects the propensity of both firms and households to hold foreign currency assets (deposits) and liabilities (loans).
We exploit variation in consumer price inflation across Russian regions to examine the relationship between the perceived stability of the domestic currency and financial dollarization. Our analysis is based on quarterly data on asset and liability dollarization as well as on local consumer price inflation for 71 regions over the period 2005:Q2 to 2014:Q2. This is an interesting period to analyze as exogenous factors, particularly food and oil price spikes, caused substantial cross-regional and time variation in Russian inflation. Moreover, a year before the start of our observation period, Russia introduced a comprehensive deposit insurance scheme which led to a rapid increase in household deposits. The scheme significantly reduced households' sensitivity to bank-specific risk (Karas, Pyle, and Schoors, 2013) , giving further prominence to monetary risks in households' deposit allocation decisions.
Our within-country data allow us to tackle two shortcomings of previous studies that rely on cross-country data. Firstly, unobserved heterogeneity in economic policies and institutions may cloud the cross-country relationship between monetary conditions and dollarization. We alleviate this concern by examining cross-regional variation within a country with a common macroeconomic policy and institutional framework. Secondly, cross-country studies cannot disentangle the impact of inflation on dollarization from that of (correlated) changes in exchange rates. We can isolate the impact of inflation on financial dollarization given that exchange rate movements are uniform over all regions within the currency union of the Russian Federation.
We show that regions with high inflation experience higher deposit dollarization and lower dollarization of (long-term) household credit and loans to firms in non-tradable sectors. The impact of inflation on credit dollarization is weaker in regions which are financially less integrated with the rest of the Russian Federation -that is to say, regions with a higher share of local banks or local bank branches and regions where banks are more reliant on local funding. In such regions the negative impact of inflation on the demand for foreign currency loans is partially offset by banks' efforts to locally intermediate the increased supply of foreign currency deposits. In contrast, in regions with more nationwide banks and banks that are not locally funded, an inflation-driven influx of foreign currency deposits can be easily distributed to other regions, reducing the need to offload them locally. Such integrated banking markets therefore allow households and firms to respond to inflation shocks by adjusting both their assets and liabilities whereas the asset-liability management of banks constrains the currency-portfolio choices of these agents in less-integrated banking markets.
Our results provide partial support to the portfolio theory of financial dollarization (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003) . This theory argues that the currency composition of assets and liabilities of risk-averse households is determined by real interest rate differentials as well as the volatility of inflation and of the real exchange rate. 1 In line with this theory, we find that higher inflation and 1 When the uncovered interest rate parity holds (no real interest rate differential) the currency composition of assets and liabilities is determined by the minimum variance portfolio (MVP).
In the case of deviations from the uncovered interest parity households deviate from the MVP therefore lower real interest rate differentials are associated with more (less) foreign currency deposits (loans). We find some evidence that variation in inflation volatility across regions impacts on foreign currency deposits but not on foreign currency loans.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. Firstly, we complement crosscountry studies which examine the relationship between domestic monetary conditions and financial dollarization. Luca and Petrova (2008) find that aggregate shares of foreign currency loans are positively related to interest rate differentials and inflation volatility whereas they are negatively related to exchange rate volatility. These results are confirmed by Basso et al. (2010) who examine aggregate credit and deposit dollarization for 24 transition countries for the period 2000-06. Our contribution to this literature is to examine cross-regional variation within the same macroeconomic and institutional framework. This reduces concerns about omitted unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to -they decrease (increase) the share of FX deposits (loans) as the real interest rate differential between the local and foreign currency widens. See Froot and Thaler (1990) for evidence on deviations from the uncovered interest parity.
2 Özbilgin (2012) provides a within-country analysis of the relation between inflation and financial dollarization for Turkey based on a DSGE model. empirically isolate the impact of inflation on dollarization from that of (correlated) exchange rate movements.
Secondly, we provide new insights into how inflation impacts financial intermediation. Boyd et al. (2001) document a negative relationship between inflation (once it surpasses a certain threshold) and banking development at the country level. Lower real returns exacerbate credit market frictions, increase credit rationing, and limit the depth of the banking sector. De Nicolό et al. (2005) show, also at the country level, that deposit dollarization moderates this adverse effect of inflation as dollarization allows households to keep deposits onshore when they face high inflation. We document how inflation affects the interaction of the demand for and supply of foreign currency funds between banks on the one hand and households and firms on the other hand. In particular, we are the first to show how the impact of inflation on dollarization depends on interregional banking integration.
Thirdly, our analysis contributes to the growing literature on regional inflation disparities within currency unions. Beck et al. (2009) compare the size and persistence of regional inflation differentials in the euro-zone and the US and show that such differentials are larger and more persistent in the euro-zone.
Regional inflation differences in both currency unions are related to structural characteristics of non-labor factor markets rather than labor market frictions or growth dynamics. Nagayasu (2011) and Vaone and Ascari (2012) confirm the persistence of regional inflation differences for Japan and Italy respectively.
We add to this literature by documenting how regional inflation variation may lead to the differential use of the common currency by households.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical relationship between regional inflation and financial dollarization after which Section 3 describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 4 then presents our results on the link between regional inflation and dollarization and how this link depends on regional financial integration. Section 5 concludes.
Regional Inflation and Financial Dollarization: Theory
Theories of financial dollarization have rationalized the use of foreign currency as a medium of payments (currency substitution) and as a medium to store wealth (asset substitution). As households use deposits for transaction as well as storage purposes, both currency and asset substitution provide useful theoretical frameworks to guide our empirical analysis. In this section we therefore discuss how consumer price inflation affects household currency choice in models of currency and asset substitution, respectively. More precisely, we discuss how regional inflation impacts the currency choice of depositors, borrowers and intermediaries in a setting where both interest rates and exchange rates are set nationally.
The currency substitution theory (e.g. Uribe, 1997 and Engineer, 2000) suggests that agents choose the foreign versus domestic currency as a means of payment by trading off the purchasing power risk of domestic currency versus the transaction costs of using foreign currency. Foreign currency is more likely to be used as a medium of exchange if the expected depreciation of the domestic currency is high. Thus for consumer price inflation to have an impact on currency substitution at the regional level we need to consider a framework in which households' depreciation expectations are at least partly related to observed inflation at the regional level.
Models which allow for heterogeneous signals of monetary developments across agents provide such a framework (Phelps, 1970; Lucas, 1972; Morris and Shin, 2002; Myatt and Wallace, 2014) . According to the portfolio theory of asset substitution (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003) households' currency choices for bank deposits are driven by the expected real return and real valuation risk on foreign currency vs. domestic currency deposit contracts. This theory predicts first that the share of deposits held in foreign currency will increase with the expected real interest rate differential on foreign vs. local deposits. In line with our reasoning above, higher local consumer price inflation may be associated with a higher real return on foreign currency deposits if it serves as a private signal of exchange rate depreciations. This would be particularly the case if the nominal interest rates on deposits are set homogenously across all regions. 6 The portfolio theory argues that in addition to the difference in expected real returns, risk-averse households will consider the variance in the real value of for a model of how noisy exchange-rate signals can lead to persistent financial dollarization in an economy with heterogeneous agents. Fratzscher et al. (2015) provide an empirical analysis of scapegoat models in which agents associate unobserved trading shocks with observable fundamentals.
5 See Brown and Stix (2014) for evidence on the hysteresis of monetary expectations in developing economies. 6 While interest rates differ across local Russian banks, the rates of branches of the main nation-wide state banks -in particular Sberbank and VTB-are uniform. Sberbank and VTB capture about 50 and 6 percent of the Russian deposit market, respectively, and are present in all regions. Both banks offer the same deposit terms in all locations. foreign currency vs. domestic currency deposits. The minimum variance portfolio will hereby be characterized by a higher share of foreign currency deposits as the variance of nominal inflation increases and the variance of the real exchange rate decreases. Thus, the portfolio theory suggests that not only a higher level of regional inflation may be associated with an increase in the holding of dollarized deposits, but also -all else equal -a higher volatility of regional inflation.
The portfolio theory also provides a framework to discuss how regional inflation may affect the demand for foreign currency loans from (unhedged) borrowers. Higher expected real borrowing costs for foreign currency loans as opposed to domestic currency loans should lower demand for the former.
Again, if regional inflation provides a (private) signal for expected depreciation it would decrease foreign currency demand from households and firms which rely on domestic currency income. Beckmann and Stix (2014) document that households which expect a domestic currency depreciation are less likely to demand foreign currency loans.
In sum, both the currency substitution and the portfolio theory predict that high regional inflation increases FX deposits if households interpret the region-specific inflation they experience as a private signal of imminent exchange-rate deprecation. Analogously, the portfolio theory suggests that higher regional inflation may also lead to a reduction in the demand for FX loans. In the remainder of this paper we put these predictions to the test.
Data and Methodology

Data
The units of our analysis are 71 federal 'subjects' of the Russian Federation (referred to henceforth as regions).
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We collect quarterly end-of-period data on both consumer price inflation and credit and deposit dollarization in each of these regions from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
Our data are particularly well suited for testing the impact of regional inflation on dollarization. To facilitate cross-regional analysis and provide a consistent purchasing power measure, Rosstat has devised a consumer price index that tracks monthly price dynamics of a fixed basket of consumer goods and services across all Russian regions. We use this index to calculate for each region and for each quarter a year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate and inflation volatility. We define the latter as the standard deviation of the monthly price index in the twelve months before the end of a quarter. The first spike was caused by a sharp increase in the price of heating services which coincided with rising oil prices. The second and third spikes were largely driven by food inflation. World food prices accelerated dramatically in 2007-08 following droughts in a number of grain-producing countries, the increased use of bio-fuels and high oil prices which raised transportation and fertilizer costs. Summer droughts in 2010 again pushed up food prices. These dynamics played out differently across Russia depending on regional natural resource endowments and infrastructure quality. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We obtain our data on bank deposits and on credit to firms and households from the CBR. The central bank requires all commercial banks to submit detailed information on their quarterly activities by geographical location.
These region-specific banking data are classified by client type (households or firms) and by currency denomination (domestic or foreign). This allows us to trace how regional consumer inflation affects the currency denomination of new household deposits and loans with banks. Lastly, the variable Corporate debt dollarization measures the share of newly extended firm credit in foreign currency as a share of total new lending to firms. We distinguish between the dollarization of new lending to firms in tradable versus those in non-tradable sectors, using the classification of Jensen and Kletzer (2005) . We expect that firms have different exchange rate exposures according to whether they sell in domestic or foreign markets.
According to central bank statistics the average bid-ask spread for rouble-US$ retail transactions was 1.63 percent during the period of our study. Exporters, with a (full or partial) natural hedge against the currency risk associated with FX-denominated debt, typically match the currency denomination of their liabilities with that of their incoming cash flows. Their demand for FX loans will be relatively insensitive to local inflation. In contrast, we expect that (unhedged) firms in non-tradable sectors behave more like households. Their demand for FX loans may be more sensitive to regional inflation and to changes in the supply of FX loans by local banks.
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The third panel of Figure 2 shows the average share of newly extended FX loans to Russian firms in non-tradable sectors as a share of total new bank lending to these firms. We observe again substantial cross-regional variation.
For instance, the average quarterly change in this share of FX lending was 11 Evidence from a large number of developing countries suggests that firms in non-tradable sectors experience an increase in currency mismatches during boom periods when banks provide them with relatively cheap FX loans (Rancière, Tornell, and Vamvakidis, 2010) .
Methodology
As discussed in Section 2, both the currency substitution and the portfolio theories of financial dollarization predict that high inflation increases FX deposits. The portfolio theory also predicts a reduction in the demand for FX loans while suggesting that high inflation volatility and low volatility of the real exchange rate result in a high share of both FX assets and liabilities.
Section 2 also highlighted two channels through which regional inflation can affect dollarization. First, given that interest rates on loans and deposits (for domestic currency and foreign currency funds) are largely homogeneous across Russia, higher regional inflation implies lower real interest rate differentials. Therefore, for given exchange rate expectations, higher regional inflation should encourage households to save in foreign currency and borrow in domestic currency. Second, regional inflation may serve as a (noisy) signal of future exchange rate developments. If higher observed inflation in a region leads households to expect a depreciation of the domestic currency, then for given interest rates households will be more likely to save in foreign currency and borrow in domestic currency. Based on these considerations we estimate the following empirical model:
The dependent variable ∆FX it is the share of either net deposits flows, newly extended firm credit, or newly extended mortgages that is denominated in foreign currency in a region i in quarter t. Inflation (INFL it-1 ) as well as inflation volatility (INFL_VOL it-1 ) are expected to impact these regional dollarization variables and we therefore include both, either separately or jointly (the pair-wise correlation coefficient between both variables is 0.29).
Both inflation and inflation volatility are included one quarter lagged to allow for a gradual pass through. Note that as we use past inflation as an indicator of future inflation, we implicitly assume that inflation expectations are adaptive in nature (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) .
Exchange rate volatility and interest rates are homogenous across regions and absorbed by time fixed effects α t . The region fixed effects α i account for (timeinvariant) differences in the risk aversion of households across regions, as well as the persistent part of cross-regional inflation differentials. Such persistent differentials can reflect different income levels (the Balassa-Samuelson effect)
as well as frictions in factor markets (Beck et al. 2009 ). We estimate all regression specifications using robust standard errors clustered by region in order to control for possible residual correlation across time for a given region.
The vector X it captures time-varying regional characteristics which may simultaneously drive changes in regional inflation and dollarization.
According to the literature on the determinants of regional inflation these could include changes in economic structure and/or changes in local factor market frictions. We therefore include trade openness (quarterly growth of regional trade (imports plus exports) with foreign countries); the value of tradable goods (quarterly growth of the regional value added of the manufacturing and commodity-extraction industries); and the value of nontradables (quarterly growth of the regional value added of the construction, electricity generation, services, retail, and wholesale trade industries) as control variables in our empirical model.
Regional inflation and financial dollarization might also be correlated because both are impacted by local fiscal policy which differs across regions and over time. For example, De Gregorio (1994) demonstrates that public expenditures can induce an increase in the relative price of non-tradables. Fiscal transfers to specific household types may also alter the currency denomination of their savings. In order to control for these effects we include the y-o-y growth of regional government spending as an additional covariate in X it .
X it also contains four dummy variables which account for the entry and exit of regional or multiregional banks over the previous year. These dummies are switched on if there is an increase or a decrease in the number of locally incorporated banks or an increase or a decrease in the number of branches of banks incorporated in another region. We hereby control for sudden changes in the local banking landscape which may lead to one-off 'jumps' in dollarization on either the asset or liability side of the regional banking system.
Accounting for Financial Integration
Russia's regions vary considerably with respect to how strongly the regional banking sector is integrated with the rest of the financial sector. We employ four indicators to measure the degree to which the banking sector in a region is integrated or closed. First, we calculate the share of locally incorporated banks On average, nearly one-third of the banks operating in any region in Russia are local and operate in that region only. However, the share of local banks varies between zero and 73 percent (see Table A2 ). The share of branches operated by local banks is 7 percent on average but again this varies from zero to 50 12 The exception is Proportion local bank branches i which is measured for 2012 due to a lack of earlier data. percent across regions. Therefore, only nation-wide banks operate in some regions whereas in other regions the majority of banks and bank-branches are local. This variation is also reflected in the proportion of bank liabilities that are held by local banks. This proportion varies between zero and 94 percent.
Our data also show similar variation in terms of banks' reliance on retail deposits. On average 41 percent of bank liabilities are made up of customer deposits. But in some regions the share of retail deposits is a mere 9 percent whereas in others it amounts to 68 percent.
We exploit the regional heterogeneity in banking sector integration to test the conjecture that the negative impact of inflation on credit dollarization should be weaker in regions with less-integrated banking sectors. The reasoning is that in regions with less integrated banking sectors, banks cannot allocate FX funds across regions, neither via external markets nor through internal capital markets. coincide. This is because inflation incentivizes households to supply banks with FX deposits but also to demand more domestic currency lending. This implies that financially integrated banking systems allow households to deviate more from MVP and thus to better adjust their currency portfolio. 13 Evidence from the U.S. (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004 and Loutskina and Strahan, 2015) ; Japan (Imai and Takarabe, 2011) and the Netherlands (Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2011) indicates that nation-wide banks actively reallocate funds across regions within one and the same country.
The above hypothesis relies on the assumption that banks in regions with closed banking sectors manage on-balance-sheet currency risk by adjusting the currency structure of their loans to that of the (given) currency structure of their deposits. Recent evidence suggests that this is the case in many emerging markets. Brown and De Haas (2012) as well as Brown et al. (2014) document that the currency structure of customer deposits (rather than the currency structure of wholesale funding) is a crucial driver of the currency structure of banks' loan portfolios. Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2014) argue that a large share of foreign currency retail loans in Eastern Europe is supply-driven, as banks are eager to match the currency structure of their assets and liabilities. Anecdotal evidence confirms that Russian banks that experience an increase in FX deposit inflows react by extending more loans in FX.
14 While banks could in principle place FX deposits in their correspondent account at the central bank or in the interbank market, they would have to forego a substantial amount of interest income.
Based on this evidence we expect that the impact of inflation across Russian regions on the dollarization of household deposits is independent of the integration of the banking market, while the impact of inflation on loans to households and firms in the non-tradable sectors is less negative in regions with closed bank sectors. We empirically test this prediction by augmenting our baseline specification with an interaction term of inflation with one of four measures of regional banking integration. Equation (2) coefficient of the interaction term to be positive: the impact of inflation on credit dollarization will be less negative in regions with non-integrated banking sectors.
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By contrast, in our estimation of deposit dollarization we expect the interaction term to be insignificant.
Results
Inflation and Dollarization -Baseline Results
We report our baseline results in Table 1 . As dependent variables we use the dollarization of the net flow of households' deposits (columns 1-3) and of new corporate lending (columns 4-9). We split up corporate lending into loans to firms in non-tradable versus tradable sectors. All specifications include region and time (i.e. quarter) fixed effects.
The key message that emanates from Table 1 [Insert Table 1 here]
The role of regional financial integration
In Table 2 we analyze how the relationship between regional inflation and dollarization is affected by the local banking structure. The results in columns 1-4 confirm that the impact of inflation on deposit dollarization is independent of how integrated the local banking sector is. The interaction terms [Insert Table 2 here]
Taken together, the results in Table 2 indicate that the impact of price instability on credit dollarization depends on the structure of the local banking system. The impact is strongest if banks are more integrated with the rest of the Russian economy. 
Inflation and Mortgage Dollarization
In Table 3 we replicate our analysis to assess the impact of regional inflation on the dollarization of new mortgage loans.
18
Because the market for FX mortgages collapsed when the global financial crisis hit Russia in 2008, our sample period is significantly shorter here. We are nevertheless able to fully replicate our earlier results for lending to firms in non-tradable sectors. [Insert Table 3 here] Table 4 presents various robustness tests. We start by showing a number of replications of our baseline estimates for the impact of inflation on deposit dollarization as reported in column 3 of Table 1 . In column 1 of Table 4 we exclude our standard set of regional time-varying covariates while in column 2
Robustness
we exclude the dummy variables that control for the entry and exit of regional and multiregional banks over the previous year. Both robustness tests yield similar estimates for Inflation as those in our baseline regressions, both in 18 The average maturity of rouble (FX) mortgages in our dataset is 16.3 (14.5) years.
terms of economic magnitude and statistical significance. In columns 3-8 we replicate these robustness tests for our baseline regression of the effect of inflation on firm and mortgage dollarization. Here as well our baseline estimates are robust to changes in the control variables.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Conclusions
In this paper we exploit regional variation in consumer price inflation as well as in the dollarization of household deposits and loans in one of the world's largest currency blocks, the Russian Federation, to analyze the relationship between the stability of the domestic currency and financial dollarization. Our within-country data allow us to empirically isolate the impact of observed inflation on financial dollarization from that of (correlated) nominal exchange rate movements. In the process we also ease concerns about omitted unobserved heterogeneity in economic policies and institutions. We find robust evidence that regions with higher inflation exhibit stronger dollarization of household deposits and weaker dollarization of long-term household credit and credit to firms in the non-tradable sectors. The negative impact of inflation on credit dollarization is weaker in regions where the banking sector is less integrated. In these regions banks have to adjust their lending structure to inflation-driven changes in the currency composition of new deposit inflows.
Our findings shed new light on how inflation impacts on financial intermediation in emerging markets. In particular, while inflation stimulates households to save in a foreign currency it simultaneously leads them to borrow in the domestic currency. Price instability thus tends to create currency mismatches on banks' balance sheets and banks that want to avoid such mismatches can take two courses of action. Firstly, they can try to offload the FX deposits in the form of FX loans. In this way they transfer the currency risk to (unhedged) Q2 2005-Q2 2008 and Q4 2009-Q2 2014) . Robust standard errors are clustered by region and t-statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table 4 Deposit dollarization
Regional inflation and financial dollarization across Russia -Robustness
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of regional consumer price inflation on dollarization across Russia's regions. Columns 1-3-5-7 report regressions without regional time-varying covariates. Columns 2-4-6-8 report regressions without the dummy variables to control for the entry and exit of regional and multiregional banks over the last year. Robust standard errors are clustered by region. t-statistics appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
